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Social Media platforms in Cyberspace provide communication channels for individuals,
businesses, as well as state and non-state actors (i.e., individuals and groups) to conduct
messaging campaigns. What are the spheres of influence that arose around the keyword
#Munich on Twitter following an active shooter event at a Munich shopping mall in
July 2016? To answer that question in this work, we capture tweets utilizing #Munich
beginning 1 h after the shooting was reported, and the data collection ends approximately
1 month later1. We construct both daily networks and a cumulative network from this
data. We analyze community evolution using the standard Louvain algorithm, and how
the communities change over time to study how they both encourage and discourage
the effectiveness of an information messaging campaign. We conclude that the large
communities observed in the early stage of the data disappear from the #Munich
conversation within 7 days. The politically charged nature of many of these communities
suggests their activity is migrated to other Twitter hashtags (i.e., conversation topics).
Future analysis of Twitter activity might focus on tracking communities across topics
and time.




On July 22, 2016, a mass shooting occurred in a shopping mall in Munich, Germany. The attacker
was quickly identified by local police as an 18 year old German-Iranian dual national resident of
Munich (Harrison, 2016). As is often the case after high impact incidents like mass shootings, there
was a high volume of conversation in social media associated with this shooting. Conversations
range from official government accounts providing instructions to affected people, speculation
regarding the identity and motivation of the attacker(s), and individuals or news organizations
providing reports (accurate or otherwise) of the event. As micro-blogging services like Twitter
become more popular, it becomes interesting to analyze the data generated by the service in an
attempt to extract topologies or trends that may provide insight into the event in question. A
timeline of this event is displayed in Figure 1.
1The collected dataset will be posted online for public use once the research work is published.
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FIGURE 1 | Timeline of attack (Zeitung, 2016).
1.2. Motivation: Twitter Connection to
Information Warfare
The Internet and Cyberspace foster many types of activities
that involve different aspects of human social interaction.
We can visualize and analyze the relationships that convey
these interactions using network science techniques. Twitter is
undoubtedly a common channel by which significant online
social interaction occurs. Individuals, organizations, and nation
states all use this tool as a medium of communication and many
interested listeners, then retweet statements they believe deserve
the attention of others. Both the real world and contrived activity
generate conversations around a particular hashtag. Regardless
of the authenticity of an event, the social interactions that
occur during and after its occurrence have a real effect on the
way humans perceive the world and can influence their future
actions both in the world and in Cyberspace. To improve our
appreciation for how message information both spreads and
decays, we increasingly study and understand how information
campaigns develop and change.
Information Warfare has been occurring for as long as
parties have been trying to deceive their opponents. While the
information itself may not be physical, it is considered by social
scientists and the Department of Defense in Joint Publication
1 (Department of Defense, 2013) as one of the instruments of
national power that the nation states utilize in order to pursue
their ends. The other instruments include Diplomatic, Military,
and Economic power (DIME) (Department of Defense, 2013).
At first glance, Twitter seems to offer the empowerment of free
speech to any user, and yet our analysis of the retweeting that
occurs helps demonstrate how little many users are interested
in genuine original thought. Rather, the majority of traffic tends
to gravitate toward sharing the thoughts of a few accounts.
We believe that such influence, while not forced by any
entity, still offers tremendous power for parties engaged in
Information Warfare to increase their power within the domain
of Cyberspace. This power is not limited to national security and
a nation’s foreign policy but extends into the realms of domestic
politics, sports, business, and many other areas.
Does Twitter offer the empowerment of free speech to any
user? And does that make a difference? To understand this,
we analyze the Twitter data we collected on the Munich attack
using Netlytic (Gruzd, 2016), a software that captures data
and can perform social network analysis as well. We collected
dataset focused on the surge in Twitter activity using #Munich
linked to the July 22 shootings which garnered international
attention across social media and traditional reporting channels.
We analyze both temporal slices of the data and the cumulative
dataset to better understand how information and messages
propagate across Twitter. In particular, we are interested in the
community structure, its evolution, and the role of top influential
leaders within these communities.
The main contributions of the paper are: (1) The collection of
the hashtaged #Munich dataset from Twitter for an active shooter
event at a Munich shopping mall in July 2016. (2) The general
analysis of the cumulative network of retweets for this incident.
(3) The evolution of the influence flow-based communities in
temporal network of timeslices by day. In section 2 we discuss
related work. Section 3 covers the problem definition and the
details of the collected dataset. In sections 4 and 5, we discuss
the methodology and results, respectively. The paper concludes
with several future directions.
2. RELATED WORK
In the current era of social networking, information sharing
has been easier by posting microblogs (Kempe et al., 2003;
Leskovec et al., 2007). The influence spreads very fast over
the network and impacts the opinion of the users or maybe
groups of users, i.e., communities (Lin et al., 2008). Researchers
have studied the influence propagation on Social networking
platform and their impact on network structure (Sadikov and
Martinez, 2009; Chen et al., 2013; Saxena et al., 2015). Hong
et al. (2011) proposed amethod that successfully predicts popular
tweets using the content of the message, temporal information,
metadata of messages and users, structural properties of the users’
social network.
Of more specific interest to us is the study of spreading
behavior of tweets in case of attacks, hazards, natural calamities,
etc, and how it affects the opinion of the users. Nadamoto et al.
(2013) observed that the spreading of rumor during the disaster
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situation is different from the normal situation. In a disaster
situation, the rumor goes through two or three hierarchy, but
in the normal situation, it passes through many hierarchies. In
the case of news spreading during disasters, Jin et al. (2014)
showed that lies, half-truths, and rumors spread in the same
way as true news using tweets during the Ebola crisis. On the
other hand, Mendoza et al. (2010) showed that the propagation
of rumor differs from the true news, and this information can
be used to detect rumors using aggregated analysis on tweet
dataset collected on the 2010 earthquake in Chille. Spiro et al.
(2012) proposed a model for the waiting time of retweets and
showed that the hazard related tweets have a shorter waiting time.
For a non-disaster situations, Vosoughi et al. (2018) observed
that the false news spread faster, farther and deeper, and are
more prominent in the case of political news than financial,
disaster, terrorism or science-related news. This research is based
on Twitter data spanning 11 years comprising around 126,000
stories tweeted by around 3 million people. A brief survey on
influence propagation on online social networks can be seen
at Bonchi (2011).
How do communities emerge while influence spread? Gupta
et al. (2016) studied the role of core-periphery structure
in the information propagation to multiple communities.
Complementing the spreading behavior, we are also interested
in identifying influential user or users on Twitter, the emergence
of influential leaders in different communities, how they shift
from one community to another and how they die out (Tsur
and Rappoport, 2012; Riquelme and González-Cantergiani,
2016). More specific, understanding this phenomenon based on
dominant language per hashtag to trace which users overlap
between the thematic and linguistic communities delineated
by different information streams (Bastos et al., 2013). Our
research examines several language communities that intermix
with political leanings of conversations, Spanish, French, and
English all use #Munich although it is important to remember
the German discussion mostly emerged under #München. By
studying the dependencies between global features such as graph
topology and content features emergence helps in explaining
how long members might remain in the community and the
importance of repeated messaging to maintain the community of
influence over time. Successful prediction of the spread of memes
can improve marketing efforts whether the target is a commercial
product or an idea being promoted.
Influence propagation has also been studied using the
multilayered structure of online social networks. The layers
depict either different type of relationship, allowing the
researchers to perform studies at different granularity (Li et al.,
2012; Zhuang and Yağan, 2016) or the layers representing
followers, mentions or retweeting (Borondo et al., 2015). We
also include the multilayer aspect in our research in a different
way, namely temporally. Wang et al. (2008) stated that most
nodes lack stability in the evolution of the network between time
steps, and the manner in which time is partitioned will determine
how communities are detected. This inspires our analysis to
examine if and how accounts migrate between communities over
time. Yet, in terms of stability, Romero et al. (2011) highlighted
that hashtags on politically controversial topics are particularly
persistent, with repeated exposures continuing to have unusually
large marginal effects on adoption. In this research, we do not
specifically examine how long certain messages persist, but the
observation about political messages lasting longer is related to
how long individuals choose to continue retweeting the same
leader accounts over multiple days. That information is captured
in themultipartite temporal network, and it is shown in section 5.
Smith et al. (2014) from the Pew Research Center found six
different network structures (Polarized Crowds, Tight Crowd,
Brand Clusters, Community Clusters, Broadcast Network,
Support Network) that emerge in social media networks. They
study how the structures differ based on the content of the issues
driving the discussion, highlighting the importance thatmost real
social networks are usually a hybrid of multiple structures. The
research shows that Broadcast Network, and Support Network
have large size groups, Tight Crowd has medium size groups,
and Brand clusters and Community Clusters have many small
sized groups. The structures of interest to the #Munich dataset
were the Community Clusters, and Broadcast Network. Both
of these structures appeared within the context of the retweets
in the month following the July 2016 attack in Munich. The
Pew researchers give voice to the idea that mapping the social
landscape using networks helps interpret trends, topics, and
implications of the technologies being used. Our analysis of the
#Munich data regarding the polarized crowd supports the Pew
team’s statement that if a topic is political, it is common to see two
separate groups take shape and they form two distinct discussion
groups that mostly do not interact with each other. The groups
are recognizably liberal or conservative (Smith et al., 2014). Each
group links to a different set of influential people or organizations
that can be found at the center of each conversation cluster.
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND DATASET
The broader problem examined in this research is how social
media spheres of influence in Cyberspace can be employed
to conduct information operations campaigns. We analyze the
communities of influence in the considered dataset and their
evolution over time.
The approach to solving this problem uses efforts similar
to Pew Research (Smith et al., 2014) work on Social Media,
personalized for the #Munich Dataset. Our background research
leads to the understanding that the structure of the network we
create affects how communities emerge. In this work, we focus
on retweets only, because they convey the aspect of influence, as
individuals choose to associate with particular leader’s thoughts.
The network’s nodes are thus the Twitter accounts that have
retweets at least once, and directed edges connect retweeting
accounts to the account of origin for that message.
The original data captured in Netlytics consists of 13 files of
total 655 MB (Gruzd, 2016). It conveys all Tweets captured from
July 22, 2016 to August 22, 2016 labeled with #Munich. This
discussion topic involved 147,116 Twitter accounts that either
tweeted or re-tweeted #Munich messages during those 32 days.
Each row of the dataset containes several categories including
the text of the Tweet, date, time, author, type of device it was
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posted from when user/account was created, and the Twitter
profile location.
Our research focuses on the Tweets that contain the retweet
indicator, “RT@”, in the text or body of the message. Of
the total 925,019 Tweets, 79.8% were retweets, and 72% of
all retweets occurred between July 22 and July 25 which
corresponds to the first 3 days after the shooting. The Tweets
cover several languages including English, French, and Spanish,
all of which use the spelling Munich for the city. However,
very few German language Tweets are captured because German
Twitter users use the German spelling of “München” instead
of “Munich.”
4. METHODOLOGY
The raw data was used to build a directed graph G0 of the
#Munich data using the following methodology.
(1) Every unique Twitter account that occurred in our data is
represented by a node,
(2) A directed edge is placed from node u to node v if user u
retweets the tweet that was initially posted by user v,
(3) Edge weights represent the number of times user u retweeted
user v’s tweets, and
(∗) Edges in G0 did not contain any temporal information.
The resulted graph G0 has 147, 116 nodes, 191, 002 edges. To
this graph we apply a standard community detection algorithm
called Louvain (Blondel et al., 2008). The algorithm assigns
nodes randomly to communities, measures the strength of
the community partition using modularity (Newman, 2006),
and shuffles neighbors from one community to another while
maximizing modularity. The result of the Louvain algorithm is
5, 807 communities, which will become part of our cumulative
analysis of this network.
Our temporal analysis of the raw data reveals that over
72% of all retweets occurred between July 22, 2016 and July
25, 2016 as shown in Figure 2. For temporal analysis, we thus
focus the analysis on these 4 days, for which we build sub-
graphs G22,G23,G24,G25 using the same methodology described
above, but only capturing retweets of the top twenty leaders for
each day.
Building upon Smith’s observations (Smith et al., 2014), we
propose and compute the leader score for every node. This score
shows which user accounts are influential within a community,
and provide a relative scale of their influence. The leader score





We further propose a metric to compare leader-centric
communities across time, computed in two steps: (1) run Louvain
community detection on sub-graphs G22,G23,G24,G25, and then
(2) add an edge between communities if they have a shared
user. Let Ut be the set of users comprising community U on
day (t), and Vt+1 be the set of users comprising community V
on day (t + 1). We then compute the similarity between two
communities as,









Similarity metric assigns the value while considering the sizes of
the communities, as community sizes may vary a lot due to their
sphere of influence. Next, we present the analysis results using the
discussed metrics.
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In exploring the data set of all the Tweets with #Munich, we notice
that about 80% of the Tweets were individuals retweeting other
users. This dynamically captures the influence of a very small
portion of the overall accounts, because these tweets include
content that a large number of other users identify with as they
get retweeted.
The distribution of retweets vs. day is shown in Figure 2.
Observe that the distribution of all retweets for 32 days has a
strong positive skew with the majority of retweets occurring the
day after the attack. Notice that within a week, the activity returns
to a level similar to before the attack.
We begin our study with the community structure of the
cumulative dataset using Louvain algorithm, identifying 5, 807
communities. For better visualization, we create a graph G∗ from
G0 by selecting the 20 largest communities inG0.G∗ contains less
than 1% of the communities, but it still accounts for over 70% of
the nodes and 75% of the edges in G0. Figure 3 shows a plot of
the G∗ using the ForceAtlas visualization from Gephi (Bastian,
2009). A large number of edges or high edge weights between
two communities corresponds to greater proximity on the
visualization; whereas communities which share few or no edges
will be spaced further apart on the visualization.
The information box for each community in Figure 3 conveys
the following information:
1. The percent of nodes in G0 that the community comprises.





3. A brief characterization of the community based on the
profiles of its leaders using commonly accepted definitions
of conservative and liberal social views. The term social
commentary is used to emphasize the proffering of opinions
rather than the objective conveyance of information.
Figure 3 reveals a partitioning of the communities along
linguistic and political lines. We observe that a community built
around a common language and/or shared political views is more
likely to have a higher edges density. One can visually interpret
the data in Figure 3 as follows:
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FIGURE 2 | #Munich retweets by date.
• Horizontally (left to right): socially conservative communities,
politically neutral communities/news sources, socially liberal
communities
• Vertically (top to bottom): English language
communities, French language communities, Spanish
language communities.
Note that the FC Bayern Munich community might be outside
the scope of the study of the July 22nd attack, rather tweets
on football using the same hashtag(#Munich). Since the data
captured it anyway, we have shown it in the analysis.
The partitioning of communities along language and political
views reinforces the findings of the Pew study (Smith et al., 2014).
The relatively small size of the communities represents news
sources given a large number of Twitter followers many of these
news outlets have. This is likely a result of how the network is
built since it only captures the accounts who actively retweet
others yet fail to capture passive users who consume Tweets but
do not actively retweet.
Terrorist events such as the Munich attack create a unique
circumstance where we assume that leaders within preexisting
communities (fundamental communities) attach themselves to a
particular hashtag (e.g., topic) and form topic communities. This
creates the following cases for followers and leaders.
1. A user exists in the fundamental community but not in the
topic community
2. A user exists in both the fundamental community and the
topic community
3. A user exists in a topic-specific community but not in the
underlying fundamental community.
For example, user u agrees with the sentiment of leader v’s Tweet
on the topic of the #Munich and retweets v’s message. Users u
and v are in the same topic community, but not necessarily in
the same fundamental communities if in general their views do
not coincide.
To understand the influential hierarchy of the network, we
first apply the core-periphery analysis of the network using
K-shell decomposition method (Seidman, 1983). The k-shell
decomposition method assigns a k-shell value to each node,
and it works in the following way. The k-shell method first
removes all nodes of degree one until there is no node of
degree one or less, and assigns them k-shell value 1. Iteratively,
it will remove nodes of degree 2, 3, 4... and will assign them
k-shell value 2, 3, 4... respectively. While removing the nodes
of degree k, if any node is ended up having degree k or less,
will also be removed in the same iteration. The method is
stopped once each node has been assigned a k-shell value. k-
core of a network contains all the nodes having k-shell value
equal to or higher than k. Figure 4 presents the split of the
1-core, 3-core and the 5-core between the communities for a
better understanding of the core-periphery structure.We observe
that the cores of different communities are connected with each
other, thus leaders communicate or influence each others. We
also observe that the smaller communities do not have higher
influential nodes having a higher k-shell value, which could
be the reason why they did not become larger communities
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FIGURE 3 | Visualization of G*.
FIGURE 4 | Community partition within different k-cores.
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FIGURE 5 | Multipartite temporal community daily evolution.
overtime. Next, we do the temporal analysis of retweet
networks for better understanding the role and evolution of
the communities.
5.1. Temporal Leader Networks
In this section, we study the evolution of the communities found
in the cumulative graph for the first 4 days succeeding the attack.
This subset is deemed adequate by examining the frequency of
retweets in each day for the whole period. As seen in Figure 2,
the majority of traffic occurs from the 22 to 25 of July 2016.
This subset of data is used to create the multilayer network seen
in Figure 5.
In this multilayer network, the nodes represent each of the
top 20 communities, and a single layer is created for each day.
The nodes are sized by the number of users in that community
and colored by the communities they belong to in the cumulative
graph. The label of each node corresponds to the leader in
that community as defined by Equation (1). We then add an
edge from a node in one layer to a node in another layer if
there are any shared users between the two communities. This
captures the continuity of community membership. The weight
of the edge is then computed using Equation (2) as described in
the methodology.
The resulting network provides significant insight into
the evolution of communities over time. Figure 5 provides
visualization for the migration of users and leaders between
different communities. We also observe that community leaders
appear or disappear each day depending on whether they
generate a tweet message and the volume of retweets. For
example, the Russian based English language news (RTcom)
community dies out after July 23.
We further observe that a significant amount of users
retweet from the same community. Although this observation is
prevalent in the data, it is most evident in the community labeled
as French conservative social commentary. We observe that a
high amount of users that retweeted from @tprincedelamour on
July 23, 2016, did so again on the next day.
Following communities from left to right we see how they
can merge from several nodes to one or split from one over
each day, as is the case with the English conservative social
commentary (USA based) community. Lastly, the @jazayerli
community is seen to grow from the 24 to 25 of July with no
connecting edge. The lack of an edge between these two nodes
is because the community consists of just one Twitter message
generated by @jazayerli that is retweeted several times over
the 2 days.
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The cumulative and temporal graphs of the Twitter data
complement each other by providing overlapping insight
into the communities described. Figure 5 provides insight
into the nature of each community; how did leaders and
followers’ activities for a given community change across
time. Figure 3 provides an overview of each community
and its relative importance across time and the degree to
which communities and leaders are connected. Examining
the yellow colored community lead by @jazayerli, it becomes
clear from Figure 3 that this community is a peninsula (a
very small community) and Figure 5 illustrates that this
particular community dominated the #Munich retweets
on July 25.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER
DIRECTIONS
In this work, we collect and analyze the Twitter data of #Munich
July 2016 attack corresponding to a month-long period after the
July 22 shootings in Munich. We study the community structure
in the cumulative dataset as well as daily partitions and classify
each community based on the nature of its leaders and their
tweets. This study provides insight on how information spreads
on Twitter in case of an event, and we observe how the important
leaders disappear from the network of #Munich retweets after
a week of the attack. The leaders in the first week tended to
be news organizations or social leaders with strong or extreme
views. Communities expressing strong opinions were the most
active; however, as mentioned, the collected data is unable to
account for passive users (e.g., users who may read a Tweet
and internalize the information or message but do not retweet
the message). One can further study the impact of the event
on other users who are not directly involved in tweeting and
retweeting, however, have been affected by the event. The analysis
can also be extended to different social media platforms for
better understanding.
This research opens up several questions to be studied for
a better understanding of the evolution of the network in case
of terrorist attacks. One can identify the leaders and follow
them across multiple hashtags to determine topic communities of
leaders for each hashtag. By comparing a leader’s topic networks
and identifying users that retweet the leader across multiple
different topics, we can understand the development of the
fundamental and topic-based communities represented by that
leader. These communities can be further classified based on
different parameters, such as is the community passive where the
leader has many followers, but few retweets; or is it active where
the majority of users following a leader actively retweet the leader
across many different topics.
All these approaches will be fruitful in a deeper understanding
of how communities generate influence in social media networks.
Given the increasing use of online social media, the implications
for how corporations, organizations, and nation states conduct
influence campaigns will continue to grow as part of future
information operations.
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